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1. INTRODUCTION
The theme of this and the other articles of this issue, linkages
as a phenomenon in international economic law, involves some
technical legal questions of considerable interest, as well as some
fundamental issues in contemporary global governance. This Ar-
ticle' begins by sketching out the broader context which I argue
the theme subsumes, which is the growth of regulatory networks
for the governance of new forms of globalisation of the world
economy. Next, it explores the ways in which international lib-
eralisation processes tend to generate linkages with related regula-
tory regimes, and argues that the construction and management of
these linkages is a major feature of the processes of reconstruction
of the global political economy.
The main part of the paper focuses on the proposed Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment ("MAI"), negotiations for which
were formally initiated in 1995 by the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development ("OECD") Council of Ministers,
but had still failed to produce a final draft by May, 1998. A mul-
tilateral instrument dealing with international investment would
clearly fill a large gap in the network of regulatory measures gov-
erning the world economy.2 By the same token, it would inevita-
" The author is Professor of Law at Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1
4YN, United Kingdom; s.picciotto@lancaster.ac.uk.
' This Article was first presented at the December 1997 meeting of the In-
ternational Economic Law group of the American Society of International
Law, on Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Iwould like to
thank those who helped organise the meeting and facilitate my participation.
2 As is well-known, investment regulation was the missing element of the
postwar organisational design. See, e.g.., John M. Kline, International Regulation
of Transnational Business: Providing the Missing Leg of Global Investment Stan-
dards, TRANSNAT'L CORPS., Feb. 1993, at 153-64; Samuel K. B. Asante,Interna.
tional Law and Investments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND
PROSPECTS 667, 667-90 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991). This resulted partly
from the failure of the great powers to agree on the proposed Havana Charter
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bly cut across a number of existing related regimes. The issue of
linkage between related international regulatory arrangements
was brought to the fore especially by the Uruguay Round and the
broadening of the scope of the trade regime with the establish-
ment of the World Trade Organisation ("WTO"). The WTO
agreements already overlap significantly into the arena of invest-
ment, and the Singapore Ministerial Meeting in December, 1996,
established Working Groups on both trade and investment and
trade and competition policy to explore this interaction further.
3
Yet, that decision also recognised that a number of other bodies,
notably the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment ("UNCTAD"),4 are also concerned with this topic. Thus,
for an International Trade Organisation of 1948, which covered not only trade
but international business activity more generally. See id. It included powers to
make recommendations and promote agreements "to facilitate an equitable dis-
tribution of skills, arts, technology, materials and equipment," to "assure ust
and equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology
brought from one Member country to another," and to "avoid international
double taxation." 1 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM at 4, U.N. Sales No. E.96.ll.A.9
(1996). Most notably, it included a chapter on restrictive business practices, in-
cluding an international complaints and investigation procedure. See Charter
for International Trade Organization, Final Act and Related Documents, U.N.
Conf. on Trade and Employment, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4
(1948). The relevant articles are excerpted in 1 U.N. CoNF. ON TRADE &
DEv., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM at 3-13,
U.N. Sales No. E.96.ll.A.9 (1996). The prescience of the drafters of the Havana
Charter is especially notable since the ffiture trajectory of international invest-
ment, especi-ally the dominance of foreign direct investment ("FDI") and the
flowering of the Transnational Corporation ("TNC"), was hardly foreseeable at
that time.
3 During the Uruguay Round, pressures to broaden the negotiating agenda
to include investment policy were resisted, especially by developing countries,
but seveial agreements in the WTO package overlap significantly with invest-
ment, notably the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMs"), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Propety
Rights ("TRIPs"), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"),
which ado pted a very broad definition of international provision of services in-
cluding delivery through a foreign establishment. See Pierre Sauv6, Qs and As
on Trade, Investment and the WTO, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 55 (1997). The report
of the Working Group on the relation between trade 
and investment, which is
expected by the end of 1998, should appear just as the OECD negotiators make
a final attempt to save the MAI. See id. at 72.
4 Since the reorganisation of the UN Center on Transnational Corpora-
tions as the Transnational Corporations Management Division of ECOSOC in
1992, UNCTAD has taken over some of its activities and staff, and has pro-
duced the annual World Investment Report since 1991. See, e.g., U.N. CONF.
ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT,
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the OECD negotiations and the draft MAI, whatever their final
outcome, raise some interesting questions about both the political
processes which appear to be producing these complex, inter-
linked arrangements, as well as the legal means that can be used to
manage and perhaps harmonise these inter-relationships.
2. MANAGING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE NETWORKS
A central feature of the recent phase of "globalisation" has
been the growth of international regulatory networks. Increased
economic integration and interdependence has exposed the limita-
tions of the classic liberal internationalist system, based on na-
tional sovereignty within a loose framework of inter-state rules,
agreements, and organisations. Consequently, both within and
between states there has been a shift from "government" to
"governance" based on "regulation," in which state functions are
delegated to specific public bodies, operating within rule-based
bureaucracies and applying specialised professional or scientific
techniques. Thus, although national states remain the primary
focus for political legitimation, their policies are increasingly for-
mulated and implemented through decentralised layers of regula-
tion, internationally coordinated through complex networks.
5
Thus, the new forms of management of the interdependent world
economy occur through a "web of formal and informal intergov-
ernmental regulatory relationships... that simultaneously em-
powers and constrains governments," and "an intricate network
of vertical and horizontal links between all levels of government"
TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS (1996). The May 1996
Midrand UNCTAD IX Conference mandated UNCTAD's Commission on
Investment, Technology, and Related Financial Issues to pursue work related to
a possible multilateral framework on investment ("MFI"). See id. at xxxii. It
has interpreted its role primarily as that of helping developing countries to far-
ticipate effectively in international rulemaking and ensuring that the deve op-
ment dimension is adequately addressed. See id. at 129. UNCTAD's 1996
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT focused on the interlinkages between trade and
investment, and included a Part Three entitled Towards a Multilateral Agree-
ment on Foreign Direct Investment? See id. at 129-200.
5 See Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Frag-
mented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 NW. J. INT'L. L. & BUS.
1014 (1996-97).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
attempting to coordinate "regulatory systems [that] are growing
progressively more complex and multi-layered."'
Some take a positive view of this process of disaggregation of
state functions and their interlinkage through mainly informal
and flexible international arrangements. Anfie-Marie Slaughter
has argued that it constitutes a "transgovernmentalism," which
can preserve and strengthen the state, while creating "a genuinely
new world order in which networked institutions perform the
functions of a world government-legislation, administration, and
adjudication-without the form."7 Slaughter is undoubtedly cor-
rect to stress that the national state is still the primary arena for
legitimation and enforcement of societal norms. Nevertheless,
the increasingly dense and complex international institutional
networks created by pressures towards globalisation raise many
questions about both the effectiveness and accountability of ar-
rangements for global governance.
The functional fragmentation of international regulatory net-
works creates both an enforcement gap and a democracy deficit.
The establishment of internationally-agreed standards, and ar-
rangements for the coordination of their application or enforce-
ment, tends to take place through select and informal groups of
specialists frequently operating within a strong professional ideol-
ogy. These often ignore or by-pass the state-based framework of
intergovernmental organisations. The activities of specialised
global "issue networks" may be underpinned by strong and shared
professional ideologies,' but they lack the broader legitimacy pro-
vided by national social and political structures. If a "global civil
society" can be said to be even incipient, as argued by some, 9 it
certainly lacks an adequate institutional basis. Instead, issue net-
works are formed ad hoc, and attach themselves opportunistically
to more formal organisations as necessary, for the purposes of re-
sourcing or legitimising their activities. These broader-based and
more formal organisations may be used to provide some legitima-
6 Scott H. Jacobs, Regulatory Co-Operation for an Interdependent World: Is-
sues for Government, in REGULATORY CO-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDE-
PENDENT WORLD 15, 15-17 (Scott H. Jacobs ed., 1994).
7 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183,
195 (1997).
See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International
Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L. ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
See Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of
Global Civil Society, 21 MILLENIUM 389 (1992).
[V7ol 19:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss3/2
1998] INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTREGULATION 735
tion for internationally-agreed standards, due to their higher pub-
lic profile. They may also help with the enforcement gap, by cre-
ating linkages with other issues which might secure their wide-
spread implementation.
10
However, in many ways these bodies provide just a conven-
ient institutional shell. The choice of one organisation rather
than another is influenced not only by the appropriateness of its
concerns or formal competence, but often more by its member-
ship and the effects of that on the nature and quality of outcomes
from negotiations. Thus, a central feature of global governance in
the current period is the strategic maneuvering through the maze
of arenas, and formation of linkages between a wide range of regu-
latory arrangements and more formal organisations. It is through
this process that world markets are being restructured, and new
institutional frameworks are being devised for international trade
and investment. From this perspective, the issue of linkages in-
volves not only technical legal questions of considerable interest
and some complexity, but also wider social, economic, and politi-
cal considerations.
3. LIBERALISATION AND THE SHIFT FROM NEGATIVE TO
POSITIVE INTEGRATION
More broadly, the process of functional fragmentation and
regulatory networking results from the weakness of the classic
liberal international system, re-established in the postwar settle-
ment in the form of an "embedded liberalism."" This restored
the nationally-based systems of economic management on which
1 Thus, for example, the work on setting and enforcing standards for the
global banking system by bodies such as the Basle Committee on Banking Su-
pervision, and' the Financial Action Task Force, has intersected with, and in
many ways depended on, more formal organisations such as the BIS, OECD,
IMF, IBRD, and G7. The work of the Basle Committee has become much
more high-profile in the past decade or so, given impetus by the perceived need
to respond to dramatic crises such as BCCI and Barings. Significantly, how-
ever, the Core Principles for Banking, which it produced in 1997 as a distilla-
tion of its work to establish minimum prudential standards for supervision of
financial institutions, was presented to the Annual Meeting of the lvIF/IBRD
in Hong Kong in 1997 for endorsement and wider promulgation, and proposals
for "improving the architecture of the global financial system" presented to the
G7 in Birmingham in 1998 envisage an enhanced role for the IMF and IBRD.
1 John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379, 382-83
(1982).
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social and political consensus depended, but within a framework
of international arrangements geared towards progressive liberali-
sation under the aegis of the IMF and the GATT. The encour-
agement towards progressive relaxation of tariffs and exchange
controls, and the resultant increase in cross-border trade and in-
vestment, gradually undermined the nationally-based systems of
economic management and democratic legitimation. However,
liberalisation by the removal of barriers to markets has also led to
pressures to underpin increasingly integrated global markets with
adequate, internationally-coordinated regulatory arrangements.
For money and finance, the introduction of partial currency
convertibility after 1958, combined with nationally-oriented
monetary policies of the major powers, fostered the growth of
offshore financial markets, which in turn sank the fixed-rate IMF
regime. The pressures of global finance have gradually over-
whelmed national institutional and regulatory frameworks, as the
rapid growth of new forms of financial intermediation have un-
dermined structural barriers and led to the introduction of com-
petition into national financial markets. Thus, current account
convertibility undermined the fixed exchange-rate system; cur-
rency floating led to full convertibility; and since the mid-1980s
there has been a gradual relaxation of restrictions, both on the
ability of residents to borrow from foreign capital markets, and
conversely on the right of foreign borrowers to tap domestic
markets, or of domestic savings to be invested abroad. However,
the consequent rapid growth in short-term international capital
flows has also led to the threat of volatility, which has been
blamed for the Mexican crisis of 1994 and the Asian crisis of 1997-
98, the repercussions of which are still continuing. This has led to
calls by authoritative figures such as Joseph Stiglitz, chief econo-
mist of the World Bank, for the regulation of short-term capital
flows. 12 Indeed, since the mid-1970s the liberalisation of capital
markets and the opening up to greater competition of relatively
closed channels of financial intermediation has led to a movement
towards formalised regulation, loosely coordinated internation-
12 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Boats, Planes and Capital Flows, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
25, 1998, at 32; Joseph Stiglitz, The Role ofInternational Financial Institutions in
the Current Global Economy, Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Rela-
tions (Feb. 27, 1998) (visited Aug. 26, 1998) <http://www.worldbank.org
/html/extdr/extme/ssp022798.htm >. A contrary view has been expressed by
Lawrence Summers, deputy secretary of the U.S. Treasury. See Lawrence
Summers, Go with the Flow, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1998, at 18.
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ally through bodies such as the Basle Committee on Banking Su-
pervision. Thus, although liberalisation has required deregulation
through the removal of border controls and structural barriers to
market access, it has also involved re-regulation through the in-
troduction of formalised prudential requirements for intermediar-
ies, and conduct of business rules.
In parallel with this, trade liberalisation has also involved the
removal of border barriers, bringing into sharper focus the trade-
restrictive effects of variations between national regulations, and
hence the issue of international coordination of regulatory ar-
rangements and the role of international standards. Thus, the
success of GATT negotiating rounds in reducing tariffs on manu-
factured goods shifted attention to the so-called non-tariff barriers,
or the trade effects of regulatory differences. Here, the pressures
to open markets brought into question national regulation of
many areas of social and environmental concern, requiring
GATT to evaluate the balance between the free trade imperatives
of its nondiscrimination rules and the various exemptions for na-
tional policies in Article XX. GATT codes, initiated in the To-
kyo Round, and formalised as WTO Agreements, especially the
agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT") and Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS"), establish criteria for the
evaluation of whether national regulation is unnecessarily trade-
restrictive, generally creating a presumption of validity for na-
tional rules that implement internationally-agreed standards.
Perhaps not surprisingly, GATT panels generally tended to fa-
vour free trade, as seen in reports such as Thai Cigarettes3 and the
Tuna-Dolphin cases.
1 4
Thus, the main impetus in the phase of globalisation that
gathered momentum during the 1980s was liberalisation, initially
seen as requiring the removal or reduction of national barriers to
the flows of commodities and capital. Although this was often re-
ferred to as involving deregulation, this has widely been recog-
13 Thailand: Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Ciga-
rettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991).
14 Unpublished GATT Panel Report on United States: Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, June 16, 1994, availaTble in LEXIS, Area of Law-By Topic Li-
brary, GATT Panel and World Trade Decisions File (ITRADE; GTTWTO );
Unpublished GATT Report on United States: Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
Sept. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993).
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nised as a misnomer."5 The opening up of markets to increased
competition certainly involved the ending of direct state interven-
tion, whether by ownership, structural controls, or informal sup-
port of cartels and entry restrictions. At the same time, however,
there has been a growth of regulation, much of it originating in or
being transmitted from international or supranational arenas or
bodies. Indeed, it can be seen that the shift towards more open
and competitive markets in many ways requires a formalisation of
regulation or a shift to legalisation to provide transparency on
which equal access to market depends. Thus, for example, the
opening up of capital markets has entailed a shift from informal
oversight by central banks or finance ministries of private or
privileged dealings between closed groups of banks and brokers,
towards a high degree of formal regulation, ranging from capital
requirements for financial institutions to rules controlling access
to and abuse of privileged information (e.g., Chinese walls, insider
dealing).
Hence, the process of restructuring the framework of global
economic activity has involved a tension between liberalisation
(the removal of national barriers to trans-border flows) and inter-
national re-regulation (the formulation of substantive standards
and rules governing global economic activity and the establish-
ment of arrangements for their coordinated enforcement). The
dominance of pressures for liberalisation has created a strong pre-
sumption, at least among neo-liberal ideologues, that regulation is
an unnecessary burden and generally results from self-interested
or protectionist motives. From this perspective, international in-
tegration means the creation of open markets, which requires
only strong provisions for the protection of property rights and
the maintenance of public order, but not much else. Certainly, at
the international level, it has proven hard to agree on regulatory
standards, which helps to explain the trend towards functional
fragmentation (discussed above), the preference for soft law, and,
in particular, the problem of inadequate coverage of, and conse-
quent loopholes in, the global regulatory networks. The estab-
lishment of international standards generally requires a political
impetus, which has occurred in relation to finance as a result of
dramatic bank losses and failures (from Herstatt Bank, through
15 See GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, DEREGULATION OR RE-REGULATION?
REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 3
(Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990); Jacobs, supra note 6, at 15-17.
[Vol 19:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss3/2
1998] INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTREGULA TION 739
Banco Ambrosiano and BCCJ, to Barings and Daiwa) or eco-
nomic crises such as the Mexican and Asian episodes. In one way
or another, moves towards more comprehensive regional or
global liberalisation generate a process of re-regulation, both by
bringing into question existing national provisions, and by gener-
ating linkages with the international arrangements within which
many regulatory regimes are now embedded, or indeed from
which they have originated.
From this perspective, the issue of linkages is not a peripheral
technical question, but a central one in the current phase of the
restructuring of the global political economy. It should be seen as
extending beyond ensuring passive accommodation or lack of di-
rect conflicts between related regulatory regimes. What is increas-
ingly called for is the creation of positive linkages across regula-
tory regimes to facilitate a shift from negative to positive
integration.' 6  In some respects, the Marrakech Agreement has
pioneered a new approach by creating conditionality linkages be-
tween the GATT market-access regime and parallel international
standard-setting arrangements. However, only in the TRIPs
agreement are these of a positive type, i.e., requiring all WTO
members to accept and enforce a minimum level of intellectual
property protection. In relation to technical and health standards,
the TBT and SPS agreements create negative linkages, which in-
validate national regulations unless they can be justified by refer-
ence to international standards or scientific principles. Hence,
they subjugate regulatory standards to the imperatives of trade,
rather than vice versa. Most importantly, these arrangements
have only hesitantly begun to take account of regulation govern-
ing the social conditions of production and consumption of
goods.
17
16 See Les Metcalfe, The Weakest Links: Building Organisational Networksfor
Multi-Level Regulation, in REGULATORY CO-OPERATION FOR AN INTER-
DEPENDENT WORLD, supra note 6, at 55-56.
17 In the first Tuna-Dolphin case, the GATT panel took the view that the
U.S. measures to protect dolphin by regulatin tuna fishing methods"could not
possibly affect tuna as a product." Unpublished GATT Report on United
States: Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991,supra note 14, at 195.
Technical regulations are defined in the TBT as those laying down product
characteristics "or their related processes and roduction methods." Final Em-
bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round orMultilateral Trade Negotiations,
Agreement on Technical Barriers of Trade, Annex 1, para. 1, Apr. 15, 1994,re-
printed in H.R. Doc. No. 316-103, at 1428 (1994). The SPS also includes
"processes and production methods," but defines the measures covered in terms
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The following discussion of the MAI will analyse the ways in
which an investment liberalisation regime would create overlaps
and linkages with regulatory arrangements, and the methods of
managing those interactions. It will also seek to explore how such
linkages might be structured in a positive way to enhance compli-
ance with and effectiveness of international standard-setting ar-
rangements. It argues that, as presently drafted, the MAI is inade-
quate, emphasising liberalisation and neglecting the problems of
interaction even where these are readily apparent. More broadly,
it argues that an international framework for investment needs a
more adequate underpinning involving positive linkages to regula-
tory regimes establishing standards, so that investors' rights are
seen to be balanced by their acceptance of responsibilities.
4. THE MAI: SIGNIFICANT STEP OR FALSE START?
4.1. The Political and Economic Background
In April, 1998, the MAI negotiations were formally suspended
for six months for "a period of assessment and further consulta-
tion between the negotiating parties and with interested parts of
their societies." 18  Since they were originally scheduled to take
only two years from May, 1995, and were extended to April,
1998, this further setback indicates that the proposal raises both
complex technical issues and important questions of global eco-
nomic governance, which merit more extensive and wide-ranging
of the risks from pests, additives or contaminants, and diseases carried by ani-
mals, plants, or pests.
18 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development,Ministerial
Statement on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI, (April 28, 1998)
<http://www.oecd.org/news and events/release/nw98-50a.htm>. It be-
came clear in February, 1998, that the agreement could not be finalised in time
for the annual OECD Ministerial Meeting, when the United States informed
the other negotiating parties at a high-level meeting of the U.S. Administra-
tion's view that it did not consider that an acceptable agreement could be ready
by that date. See ALAN LARSON, THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON
IWESTMENT: A WORK IN PROGRESS, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Apr. 1998, at 30,
33 (quoting the statement by the Assistant Secretary of Economic, Business and
Agricultural Affairs before the Subcommittee on International Economic Pol-
icy and Trade of the House International Relations Committee, Washinton,
D.C.). During the Ministerial meeting, however, last-minute objections from
others, especially the French government, necessitated a late amendment adding
paragraph three to the draft Statement, which undoubtedly reflected the gather-
ing strength of political opposition to the agreement.
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debate. Indeed, a major reason for the stalling of the negotiations
has been their exclusionary character. The negotiations were en-
trusted to a "high-level group" based at the OECD, but operating
outside the OECD committee structure. The negotiators have
been officials from the OECD member states,1 9 although non-
OECD members have been consulted. 20 Nevertheless, the inten-
tion has been to create a "free-standing" agreement to which non-
OECD members could accede on a negotiated basis.2 1 Whether
19 The proposal for a Wider Investment Instrument originated with the
OECD Committee on International Investment and Multilateral Enterprise
3CIIME") and Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions
("CMIT"), which carried out some 70 preparatory studies between 1991-95.
However, once the OECD Council of Ministers agreed to begin negotiations,
in May, 1995, a high-level Negotiating Group was established which has
worked outside the OECD committee structure. The aim was to speed the ne-
gotiations, but the result has been that the bargaining has been between na-
tional positions and has focused on the extent of the commitments to liberalize.
The implications of liberalization for specific regulatory regimes (e.g., taxation,
environmental protection, competition policy) have consequently been treated
as secondary. The bureau of the Negotiating Group has consisted of Frans En-
gering (Netherlands) Chairperson, and Al Larson (United States) and A. Saiki
Japan ) Vice-Chairpersons. Mr. Engering resigned as Chairperson with effect
from the May 1998 Ministerial. In addition to OECD members, the European
Community has been a negotiating party, represented by both the Commission
and the Presidency, working to implement guidelines agreed by an ad hoc
group of the member states. Although the EU member states have been as di-
vided both on the extent of the overall commitment to liberalization and on
specific key issues as the MAI negotiating parties as a whole, in the final analysis
the negotiation is one mainly between the EU, the United States (cum-
NAFTA), and Japan. However, the EU negotiators need to satisfy at least the
key EU member states if the final package is to be acceptable.
20 It should be noted that the 24 long-standing OECD member countries
have been augmented by the addition of Mexico in 1994, the Czech Republic
in 1995, and Hungary, Korea, and Poland in 1996. To attempt to compensate
for the exclusion of non-OECD states from the negotiations, there has been a
programme of "outreach" by holding meetings around the world to keep key
decision-makers informed. A number of states have been granted observer
status (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong-China, and Slovakia; Estonia, Lat-
via and Lithuania were added more recently), and it has frequently been said
that others have asked for the same status. See Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development, Ministerial Statement on the Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment (MAI), supra note 18.
21 See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment Negotiating Text, at ''103 (April 24, 1998)
< http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/maitext.pdf > [hereinafter MAI Text].
The MAI Text provides for accession by "any State, regional economic integra-
tion organisation, and any separate customs territory which possesses full
autonomy in the conduct of matters covered by this agreement." See id. How-
ever, this depends on the approval of the MAI Parties acting through the Par-
ties Group of the obligations undertaken by such an acceding state, which es-
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or not an agreement is signed, or succeeds in obtaining the requi-
site ratifications, the experience of negotiating the text will un-
doubtedly be carried over into later negotiations, whether at the
WTO, UNCTAD, or elsewhere. 23  Nevertheless, the choice of
the OECD as the forum, and of investment liberalisation and pro-
tection as the agenda, was a tactical move which may be consid-
ered to have hindered rather than assisted the evolution of the
broader international framework for investment that undoubt-
edly is needed.
The MAI aims to establish a comprehensive framework for
the liberalisation, as well as protection of all types of interna-
tional investment. The MAI proposals R follow a long history of
attempts to establish a comprehensive legal framework for the
sentially means acceptance of the country-specific exceptions which it wishes to
declare, which would become subject to "standstill," and potentially "rollback."
The OECD negotiating parties have begun discussions on how to treat acces-
sion negotiations especially in relation to developing countries, e.g., criteria for
acceptable exceptions, possibility and length of transition periods, etc.
If an agreement is reached and approved by the OECD Ministerial
Council in May 1999, the intention is that signatories should try to ensure rati-
fication within a reasonable period, probably 18 months. However, it would
not enter into force unless the signatories agree that a "critical mass" of ratifica-
tions has been obtained, although the mechanism by which this will be decided
is not yet settled. The key state here is clearly the United States; although EU
states have been willing to go ahead on other similar treaties without U.S. par-
ticipation (e.g., the Energy Charter Treaty, the OECD Shipbuilding Agree-
ment, and the GATS-Financial Services Agreement), they would be unlikely to
do so in the case of the MAI.
23 Some have argued that the WTO would be the appropriate forum, espe-
cially from the point of view of developing countries, being more inclusive than
the OECD. See A. V. Ganesan, Strategic Options Available to Developing Coun-
tries with Regard to a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Develo ment Discussion Paper No. 134, April 1998,
at 3. It should be remembered, however, that major countries and important
recipients of investment, such as China and Russia, are still not members of the
W=O. The issue seems sufficiently important that a mandate could be sought
from the UN General Assembly for a specific negotiation.
24 The MAI Negotiating Text and Commentary was first published unoffi-
cially on the Internet in Spring 1997, at about the time that the agreement's
signing had originally been intended, in a leaked version obtained by an NGO.
It was then officially released in an October 1, 1997 version. See MAI Text, su-
pra note 21. The Text, without the Commentary, was subsequently made
available on the OECD website, <http://www.oecd.org/df/cmis/mai/
maitext.pdf>, the latest version available for this article being that of April 24,
1998. In addition to the published sources cited, this account relies on reports
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protection of foreign investment, dating back at least to the
1920s, 25 and focus in particular on the extensive experience in the
past three decades of negotiating bilateral investment treaties
("BITs").26 However, the MAI aimed to be broader in scope than
earlier treaties, and to establish a high-standard agreement, build-
ing on existing instruments by taking their highest common fac-
tor rather than lowest common denominator. The evident inten-
tion was to take advantage of the generally more open and
welcoming climate towards foreign investment since the mid-
1980s to establish a high, legally-binding benchmark for the pro-
tection and liberalisation of all types of cross-border business.
This ambitious scope, as well as the new and changing global eco-
nomic and political conditions in which it has been developed,
raise far broader issues than the traditional concerns, which fo-
cused on post-entry fair treatment, especially compensation for
expropriation.
25 Initiatives begun in the 1920s, including a League of Nations draft con-
vention, were resumed after the failure to ratify the Havana Charter of 1948,
but were bedeviled by differences between capital-exporting and capital-
importing countries. See PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND THE LAW 573-74 (1995). Proposals from pressure groups resulted in the
Abs-Shawcross draft of 1959, and the issue was taken up by the OECD. See
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property and Resolution of
the Council on the Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property,
adopted Oct. 12, 1967, OECD Publication No. 23081 (Nov. 1967), reprintedin
7 I.L.M. 117 (1968); see also Washington Convention on the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965,
575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
26 Over 700 BITs were identified as of September 1994 in a comprehensive
study prepared under the auspices of ICSID. See RUDOLF DOLZER &
MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1 (1995). But by
January 1, 1997, the UNCTAD database listed 1,330. See U.N. CONF. ON
TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1997: TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION POLICY at 19, 366-
69, U.N. Sales No. E.97.IH.D.10 (1997). Currently the figure is estimated at
1,630. Note however that not all BITs have been ratified and entered into
force.
27 The May 1995 OECD Ministerial Council authorised negotiations
aimed at reaching an agreement by May 1997 on a "broad multilateral frame-
work for international investment with high standards for the liberalisation of
investment regimes and investment protection and with effective dispute-
settlement procedures." William H. Witherell, The OECD Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment, 4 TRANSNAT'L. CORPS. 1, 6 (1995); see also William H.
Witherell, An Agreement on Investment, OECD OBSERVER, Oct.-Nov. 1996, at
6 [hereinafter Witherell, An Agreement] (describing the MAI and how it is ex-
pected to fit into the overall frimework for international trade and investment).
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Although in some respects the process of economic globalisa-
tion has gathered further momentum in the 1990s, even as the
MAI negotiations have progressed, it has also become more prob-
lematic, and has certainly aroused more political opposition.
Flows of foreign direct investment ("FDI") resumed their rapid
growth in 1995 after a slowdown in the early 1990s.28 There has
also been a continuation of the significant changes in its composi-
tion which began in the 1980s, notably the trend towards the
broadening of FDI to include medium-sized firms, as well as
changes in its sectoral composition beyond manufacturing to in-
clude a wide range of service industries. These trends are also as-
sociated with TNCs' increasing flexibility in the location of pro-
duction or business activities, and hence in the way they access
markets. 29 Firms can treat FDI and exporting as alternatives in
their product sourcing and market access strategies, and can com-
bine them to produce an optimal mix. Thus, the choice of an in-
vestment location may be influenced by a range of business con-
siderations, including regulatory factors. Finally, FDI has become
more multilateral. In particular, the United States has gone from
being mainly the primary source of FDI to now also being its
primary recipient; and a wider range of countries which were ear-
lier exclusively recipients are now also sources.
The continued growth of FDI, and its multilateralisation, cer-
tainly provides a key justification to policy-makers for the at-
tempt to establish a more comprehensive international legal
framework. Furthermore, the fact that the vast majority of such
flows are still amongst OECD countries (85% of outflows and
65% of inflows) was argued to support the choice of the OECD as
the negotiating forum. 0 The negotiators have also built on the
experience with the OECD's other important instruments, espe-
cially its Liberalisation Codes, which date back to the early days
of the organisation.3" These are regarded as legally-binding, but
28 See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEv., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
1996: INVESTMENT, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS at
3-4, U.N. Sales No. E.96.lI.A.14 (1996).
29 See id. at 99-103.
30 See Witherell, An Agreement, supra note 27, at 6.
31 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS (1993);
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CODE
OF LIBERALIsATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS (1993); see also ORGANISATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTRODUCTION TO
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although they entail undertakings to remove restrictions, existing
controls could be maintained if declared as reservations. It is only
in the _past ten years or so that the actual commitments have hard-
ened.3 ' Notably, in 1984 the Capital Movements Code was ex-
tended to cover the right of establishment for FDI.33
Perhaps better-known in relation to TNCs are the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which were an Annex
of the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises of 1976, and are of a non-binding character. The Dec-
laration adopted the Guidelines as recommendations addressed to
firms,34 as well as two other decisions involving recommendations
to governments, and a fourth agreeing to continuing consultations
on these matters. The Decision of the Council on National
Treatment laid down a post-entry national treatment standard for
THE CODES OF LIBERALISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND CURRENT
INVISIBLE OPERATIONS (1995).
32 Thus, the Capital Movements Code commits members to the progres-
sive abolition of restrictions or obstacles to all kinds of inward and outward in-
vestment flows exhaustively defined in Annex A. This commitment is moni-
tored by a system of standstill and rollback, which requires each country to list
exceptions, which are permitted in respect of most transactions (those in List
A) only when an item is added to the list, or an obligation is extended or begins
to apply to a state (art. 2(b)). Article 1(b) requires nondiscriminatory treatment
of all non-resident-owned assets (i.e., MFN), and freedom to liquidate assets and
transfer proceeds. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, supra
note 31; see also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OP-
ERATIONS, supra note 31 (operating a similar system in relation to current in-
visible operations).
3 This was done by adding, under Direct Investments, in the List A com-
mitments (which are subject to country-specific exceptions), a note extending
its coverage to the nondiscriminatory treatment of nonresident compared to
resident investors with respect to the granting of licences, concessions or other
authorizations. The Current Invisibles Code also gives a right of establishment
for branches and agencies of foreign insurers.
3 The Guidelines establish standards in fairly general terms, covering in-
formation disclosure, competitive practices, tax compliance, employment and
industrial relations policies, and technology transfer. See ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 34-49 (1994). For the original Declaration
and Decisions annexing the Guidelines, see ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS
OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES AND DECISIONS OF THE OECD COUNCIL ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 12 (rev.
ed. 1984) [hereinafter OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT].
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foreign-controlled enterprises from other member states; 35 while
the statement on Investment Incentives and Disincentives recog-
nised "the need to jive due weight to the interests of member"
states in this regard. Finally, disputes between OECD member
states regarding the vexed question of "extraterritoriality" have
been dealt with within this framework, and have resulted in a
statement on Conflicting Requirements embodying principles on
the exercise of jurisdiction described as General Considerations
and Practical Approaches.3 7 These instruments, and the consulta-
tions and reviews under them resulting in "clarifications" or revi-
sions, have produced a considerable body of OECD practice and
policy.
Although discussion of international investment laws has gen-
erally focused on FDI, instruments such as the BITs generally de-
fine investment in very broad terms. This has become of greater
relevance with the very rapid growth of portfolio investment
flows during the 1990s, especially to "emerging markets." For-
eign portfolio capital flows to developing countries (commercial
bank lending, debt issue, and portfolio equity investment) have
been estimated at $6-8 billion p.a. in 1982-89, but jumped to over
$32 billion in 1992, and nearly $80 billion in 1993, exceeding FDI
and official lending, and far larger than the peak of commercial
bank lending in 1982. However, these have shown considerable
volatility, falling back after the Mexican crisis of 1994 to $69 bil-
lion, before rising to a peak of over $125 billion in 1996.38 The
35 This was subject to their "needs to maintain public order, to protect
their essential security interests and to fulfil commitments relating to interna-
tional peace and security." OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, supra note
34, at 12.
36 Both these instruments have been revised by the OECD Council. In
1979, members were required to notify exceptions to National Treatment, and
a procedure for Consultations between members was established for both in-
struments, through the CLIME. In 1984, the Council revised the decision on
Incentives and Disincentives to cover "measures which provide significant in-
centives and disincentives," rather than only those "specifically designed" for
those purposes, as in the earlier formulation. Id.
37 These were taken from the 1984 CIJIME Review Report and endorsed by
the Council. See id. at 23.
38 See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE (1998) (providing
figures for developing countries, defined as those having per capita income in
1996 below $9,635); see also Daniel F. Adams, Financial Markets and World Eco-
nomic Growth: Perspectives Towards the 21st Century, in XIXth Annual Confer-
ence of IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions) (Oct.
19, 1994). Figures for "emerging market economies" collected by the Institute
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dangers of this volatility became apparent again in the 1997 crises
in Asia, the continuing repercussions of which have highlighted
the potential problems of unrestricted and under-regulated private
investment flows attracted to remote markets by the lure of rapid
growth rates, which may in turn be dependent on exports into
world markets. It has been argued that investment regimes
should be structured to favour longer-term or "relational" invest-
ment such as FDI.39  The "boom in bank busts" has now been
documented by experts at the main international financial organi-
sations who conclude that the opening of capital markets should
go hand-in-hand with improvements in regulatory capacity to
avoid systemic problems for the international financial and mone-
tary system.
40
The crisis of the Asian "tigers" has contributed to the growing
political opposition to the processes of globalisation, which are
seen as having been fostered by liberalisation measures, especially
by high-profile multilateral agreements such as those setting up
the WTO and NAFTA. It is questionable whether there would
be substantial political support for further measures of interna-
tional liberalisation without equivalent or related efforts to
strengthen international standards and institutional capacities for
the protection of financial systems, the environment, consumers,
and labour. It is certainly not surprising that as reports began to
emerge publicly about the MAI it quickly generated a wide body
of opposition. Those hostile to the agreement have generally ar-
gued that it over-emphasises the rights of investors without any
of International Finance are rather different, though they show the same
trends. See INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, CAPITAL FLOWS TO
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES (1998).
39 Enrique Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment
and Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of
the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 579-80 (1996).
Jagdish Bhagwati has also recently argued that liberalization of capital flows is
unlike trade liberalization, because it deprives countries of an independent eco-
nomic policy and leaves them vulnerable to the propensity of short-term capital
to panics and manias, and that the capital mobility ideology comes from the
self-serving assumptions of a "power 6lite" based on the "Wall Street-Treasury
complex." See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade
in Widgets and Dollars, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 7 (1998).
40 MORRIS GOLDSTEIN & PHILIP TURNER, BANKING CRISES IN
EMERGING ECONOMIES: ORIGINS AND POLICY OPTIONS (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements Economic Papers No. 46, 1996); GERARD CAPRIO, SAFE
AND SOUND BANKING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: WE'RE NOT IN KANSAS
ANYMORE (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1739, 1997).
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corresponding mention of responsibilities, and that it would tend
to remove national regulation of firms without any corresponding
effort to recognise or establish internationally-agreed business
standards.
41
Certainly, this gathering critique induced the negotiators to
pay more attention to the need to placate a wider constituency. A
formal Consultation with NGOs arranged by the OECD negotia-
tors in October 1997 was attended by over seventy people repre-
senting more than thirty organisations from all regions of the
world. The growing negative publicity and criticisms pointing
to potential adverse impacts on environmental and other stan-
dards also led to the introduction or strengthening of some safe-
guards clauses. 43 Nevertheless, it seems that the suspension of ne-
41 See generally REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BEYOND THE
MAI (Ruth Mayne & Sol Picciotto eds., forthcoming 1999) [hereinafter
REGULATING].
42 See Nick Mabey, Defending the Legacy of Rio: The Civil Society Campaign
Against the MAI, in REGULATING, supra note 41.
4 These safeguards were 3-pronged: (a) the inclusion of preambular lan-
guage resolving to implement the agreement "in a manner consistent with sus-
tainable development as reflected in the Rio Declaration... and Agenda 21",
and renewing their "commitment to the Copenhagen Declaration of the World
Summit on Social Development... and to observance of internationally recog-
nized core labour standards" while noting that the ILO is the competent body
to set and enforce those standards; (b) clarifications to the text, namely (i) con-
firmation that the National Treatment clause would apply only "in like cir-
cumstances;" (ii) a "right to regulate" clause covering measures considered ap-
ropriate to ensure that investment is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
ealth, safety, or environmental concerns "provided such measures are consis-
tent with this agreement;" (iii) a requirement that states should not waive or
derogate from their own domestic health, safety, environmental, or labor
measures as an encouragement to "an investment of an investor;" (iv) inclusion
of an interpretative note to the Expropriation Clause specifyingthat the inclu-
sion of "measures tantamount to expropriation" does not establish a new re-
quirement to pay compensation for losses due to "regulation, revenue raising
and other normal activity in the public interest undertaken by governments;"
and (v) inclusion of a proviso that the Performance Requirements article should
not be construed to prevent measures (being neither arbitrary nor a disguised
restriction on investment) necessary to secure compliance wit provisions con-
sistent with the agreement, or necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health, or necessary for the conservation of living or nonliving exhaustible
natural resources; and (c) annexation of the OECD Guidelines on Multinational
Enterprises to the text of the MAI without changing their nonbinding charac-
ter. See CHAIRMAN'S NOTE ON ENVIRONMENT AND RELATED MATTERS AND
ON LABOUR, Document DAFFE/MAI98) 10 (Mar. 11, 1998) [hereinafter
CHAIRMAN'S NOTE]; see also Multilateral Agreement on Investment Negotiat-
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gotiations in April 1998 was largely due to doubts whether
enough had been done to convince domestic political constituen-
cies to accept a further impetus towards globalisation, at least
along neo-liberal lines. The nature of the internationally-
coordinated campaign against the MAI seems to have left the ne-
gotiators feeling beleaguered, and led some to conclude that the
experience "could fundamentally alter the way international eco-
nomic agreements are negotiated."4
4.2. The Basic Structure and Scope of the MAI
The MAI, as it emerged from the negotiations, increasingly re-
sembled a GATT for investments. The starting-point of the
agreement is a broad nondiscrimination obligation, requiring
both National Treatment ("NT") and unconditional Most-
Favoured-Nation ("MFN") treatment for all types of foreign-
owned investments. This provides the basic ideological justifica-
tion of the agreement in the familiar liberal terms that foreign in-
vestors should be able to compete on equal terms with nationals
on a "level playing-field." Thus, proponents deny that the MAI is
an attack on state sovereignty or entails the undermining of na-
tional regulatory standards, since all that it requires is equal
treatment. However, just as the GATT consists of an uneasy in-
teraction between broad requirements for nondiscriminatory
treatment and a series of exceptions, a similar structure is evident
in the MAI. The underlying reason is also clear and common to
both agreements. A general obligation to treat like persons alike
is mainly of symbolic value; its substantive content depends on
how it is applied in specific regulatory contexts. This is especially
so since a nondiscrimination obligation is usually imposed only in
relation to persons who previously have been treated differently
from others with whom they are now claiming parity. However,
requiring an end to explicit differentiation may result in a shift to
formal equality of treatment, within which substantive differences
can still result in different outcomes. More specifically, if foreign
investors are treated differently it is because they are in many re-
spects different. To require equal treatment does not abolish all
discrimination at a stroke, it simply opens up a series of questions
44 Guy De Jonquieres, Network Guerrillas, FiN. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1998, at
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about which differentiations are valid,45 which can only be an-
swered in relation to specific issues. Hence, it is not surprising
that the bulk of the MAI consists of provisions for the special
treatment of foreign investors, and dealing with the implications
of nondiscrimination for specific measures.
The nondiscrimination article is also deceptive, as presently
drafted, in two major respects. First, it does not require the same
or comparable treatment for foreign investors, but establishes a
minimum of "no less favourable" treatment. Thus, it does not
prohibit advantageous treatment of foreign investors in relation
to nationals. In this respect it follows the precedent set by the
BIT model and favoured by developed, capital-exporting coun-
tries, rather than the strict National Treatment standard origi-
nally put forward in the Calvo clause and advocated by develop-
ing countries.
This is exacerbated by the failure of the negotiations to tackle
the problem of investment incentives. 46  Thus, the MAI as pres-
ently conceived will do nothing to deal with perhaps the biggest
distorting factor for investment flows, the competition to attract
45 This is sometimes explicitly indicated in nondiscrimination provisions
by the addition of a "like circumstances" clause. Thus, the draft MAI, NT, and
MFN clauses include such a clause, although at present it is in square brackets.
The same problem has been identified in relation to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 44 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. See Aaditya Mattoo, National Treatment
in the GA TS: Corner-Stone or Pandora's Box, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 107, 107
(1997) (commenting that '[s]triking the appropriate balance between, on the
one hand, allowing regulators the freedom to make distinctions between serv-
ices products and, on the other, preserving liberal trading conditions, will be
even more difficult in services tan it has been in goo .". However, the
GATS only applies in relation to services for which a positive commitment has
been made, which may be conditional on reciprocal commitments from others;
furthermore, some services, notably Financial Services, are being liberalized
within a specific sectoral regime. Finally, the GATS NT provision accepts that
national treatment can take the form of "either formally identical treatment or
formally different treatment," the test being whether it "modifies the condi-
tions o competition in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member
compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member." GATS
art. XVII, paras. 2, 3. It is surprising that this provision has not been included
in the MAI, which seems out of step with the GATS on this point.
46 The draft indicates a wide disparity of views, ranging from delegations
who consider that no provision on incentives is necessary, to some who argue
for a prohibition on positive discrimination. It appears that if a provision is
agreedupon it will at most provide for future negotiations, and perhaps trans-
parency. The negotiators cite the difficulty of the problem, and the overlap
with tax arrangements, as reasons for the weakness of this provision.
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investment. This is of special concern since it is often smaller
countries with weaker economies which feel it necessary to offer
incentives that they can ill afford. It also fails to prevent a regula-
tory "race to the bottom" which may occur by states offering spe-
cial regimes for foreign investors, especially in "special economic
zones," or "export processing zones."
That the effect of the MAI could be to give foreign investors
privileged treatment can also be seen from the strict prohibitions
of Performance Requirements. These go beyond the provisions
of the WTO's TRIMS agreement, which affirms the GATT prin-
ciples of National Treatment and prohibition of quantitative re-
strictions and provides an "illustrative list" of trade-related in-
vestment requirements deemed inconsistent with them. The MAI
abandons any connection with equal treatment by establishing a
flat prohibition of export, domestic content, domestic purchase,
trade-balancing or foreign-exchange-balancing requirements. Yet
such provisions could be seen as a means of ensuring fair competi-
tion in the domestic market between TNCs and local firms. The
MAI also goes beyond such trade-related requirements and pro-
hibits obligations such as technology transfer, the location of
headquarters or research and development facilities, or the hiring
of nationals-but such requirements are permissible if made as
conditions for the "receipt of an advantage." Combined with its
failure to discipline the use of investment incentives, these provi-
sions seem calculated to exacerbate the international competition
for investments, and hence worsen the position of poorer coun-
tries less able to afford the offer of "advantages."
Secondly, the NT Article is drafted to give foreign investors a
right of establishment. This may be considered a liberalisation
measure, in the same sense as the prohibition of quantitative re-
strictions in GATT Article XI. Undeniably, however, it is a ma-
jor gain for international investors, since state sovereignty has
generally been recognised as entailing the right to decide whether,
and on what terms, to admit foreign investment. This is accepted
447in most BITS, with the notable exception of the U.S. model.4
Until 1992 the U.S. Model BIT specified that each party "shall permit
and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, on a basis no less fa-
vorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or associated activi-
ties of its own nationals or... of any third country." U.S. Model BIT, art. II,
1, reprinted in DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 26, at 242 (emphasis added).
The MAI is more explicit and follows the 1994 U.S. Model and the NAFTA
provisions (arts. 1102 and 1103) in requiring NT and MFN to be accorded to
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
The inclusion of a general right of establishment creates a general
"open door" principle for all investments, and thus has major im-
plications for the MAI, and for its prospects of establishing a new
multilateral standard for international investment.
The broad NT clause immediately brings into question the va-
lidity or application of a range of regulatory measures maintained
by all states to some degree. These may be of a general character
(e.g., laws on investment, privatisation, competition, public pro-
curement, taxation, intellectual property, etc.), or industry-
specific (e.g., for banking and financial services, telecommunica-
tions, pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles, etc.). Until now the right
of establishment has largely been confined to regional economic
integration arrangements, notably the EU and NAFTA.48 In the
Energy Charter Treaty, an industry-specific international ar-
rangement, the right of establishment was not agreed, but left for
a second phase of negotiations. 49 The GATS envisages a right of
establishment under its mode three ("establishment of a commer-
cial presence"), but only in relation to positive commitments by
members in relation both to sectors and modes of supply, rather
than a general right of establishment subject to a negative list of
exclusions.
The deregulatory implications of the "nondiscrimination"
provisions are reinforced by the explicit requirements for a special
or minimum level of treatment for foreign investors contained in
the Investment Protection provisions, which are broadly derived
from BITs. These are designed to establish a minimum standard
of treatment5 0 at a higher level than could be said to have been
investors "with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, operation,
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or other disposition of in-
vestments." MAI Text, supra note 21, at 13. As mentioned above, the "in like
circumstances" phrase is at present in square brackets in the MAI. See id.
48 The OECD National Treatment instrument (one of the decisions estab-
lished by the 1976 Declaration on International Investment Multinational En-
terprise) does not cover establishment. The Liberalization Codes have been ex-
tended to do so (subject to country-specific exceptions), although they relate to
specific regulations and not all laws.
49 See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Energy Charter Treaty and Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty Regimes, in THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WEST
GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE 321, 335 (Thomas W. Wtide ed.,
1996).
50 The wording in the MAI is "fair and equitable treatment and full and
constant protection and security," a formulation based on the U.K. and U.S.
BITs. MAI Text, supra note 21, at '57.
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generally accepted by states under customary international law.
5 1
The prohibition of expropriation goes beyond explicit acts of na-
tionalisation, since it includes "measures having equivalent effect,"
although these are not defined. However, there is an interpreta-
tive note on taxation which accepts that taxation measures may
constitute either outright or "creeping" expropriation, but not if
the measure is "within the bounds of internationally recognised
tax policies and practices."5 2 Investors are also to be guaranteed
free and immediate rights of transfer into convertible currency of
all payments related to an investment, including compensation.
It also appears to have been hoped that multilateral agreement,
at least among OECD countries, on an investment protection
standard could have been used as the basis for common action
against breaches of it, and thus help to resolve the long-running
5' The long-standing disagreements between capital-importing or develop-
ing countries and capital-exporting or developed countries on the right to na-
tionalise, the duty to pay compensation, and its quantification, are well-known.
Nevertheless, the closest to an international consensus on a general rule of in-
ternational law must be said to have been expressed in the U.N. General As-
sembly Resolutions. See G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No.
31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (establishing the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States ("CERDS)); Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N.
Doc. A/5217 (1962) (concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources).
These assert the primacy of a state's right to control all economic activity
within the state, but accept a duty to pay "appropriate" compensation, as de-
cided by the law of the host state. Capital-exporting countries have pressed for
an "international minimum standard" for the treatment of foreign-owned prop-
erty, based on the "Hull formula," which specifies that expropriation is lawful
only when carried out for a public purpose, without discrimination, and ac-
companied by "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation. The most that
can be said is that some compensation, falling short of"full" compensation, is
usually accepted as payable, whether this is based on compensation settlements
actually negotiated (often on a lump-sum basis) by states. See Richard B. Lillich
& Burns H. Weston, Lump Sum Agreements: Their Continuing Contribution to
the Law of International Claims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1988). The same is true
of arbitration awards. See Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expro-
priation of.Alien Property, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (1981); Oscar Schachter, Com-
pensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1984). Measures taken by
states to protect the interests of their investors range from overt and covert in-
terventions, to the negotiation of BITs. See ADEOYE A. AKINSANYA, THE
EXPROPRIATION OF MULTINATIONAL PROPERTY IN THE THIRD WORLD
(1980); Adeoye Akinsanya, International Protection of Direct Foreign Investments
in the Third World, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 58 (1987). This cannot be taken as
evidence of a generally accepted principle of customary international law. See
Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998).
52 MAI Text, supra note 21, at '187.
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conflicts between the United States and other OECD states over
the scope of retaliatory action. Measures enacted by the U.S.
Congress against Cuba (referred to as the Helms-Burton Act),
Libya and Iran (the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act) have aroused oppo-
sition amongst most other OECD countries due to their
"extraterritorial" scope, and blocking legislation has been passed
by the EU,53 Mexico,54 and Canada.' In exchange for continued
Presidential suspension of the controversial aspects of this legisla-
tion, the EU agreed to discuss in the MAI negotiations the devel-
opment of appropriate "disciplines" to deter acquisition of, or
dealings, in expropriated property. 6 This appeared to be a heavy
burden for the MAI negotiations to bear, since there was strong
opposition among the allies of the United States to the more ex-
treme aspects of the U.S. position. 57 Any agreement on this point
would need to satisfy Senator Helms, whose support as Chair of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would be crucial to rati-
fication of the MAI. Nevertheless, in a statement on May 18,
1998, at the London EU-U.S. Summit, in the context of the
Transatlantic Partnership, U.S. and EU leaders announced the
conclusion of an Understanding aimed at resolving these con-
flicts.5 8 It envisages the establishment of a Registry of Claims for
illegally expropriated property, and the application of disciplines
53 See Council Regulation 2271/96 on Protecting Against the Effects of Ex-
traterritorial Application of Legislation Adopted by Third Countries, 1996 Oj.
(L 309) 1; in conjunction with a Joint Action by the EU Council under sections
J3 and K3 of the Treaty of European Union.
54 See Mexico: Act to Protect Trade and Investment from Foreign Norms
that Contravene International Law, 36 I.L.M. 133 (1997).
55 See Canada: Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act Incorporating the
Amendments Countering the U.S. Helms-Burton Act, 36 I.L.M. 111 (1997).
56 See European Union-United States: Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act, 36 I.L.M. 529 (1997).
17 Title I of the Helms-Burton Act in effect accepts claims to compensa-
tion by owners of property who were nationals of the expropriating state at the
time, if they subsequently adopted U.S. nationality. This goes beyond the
scope of the MAI.
58 See The European Union in the U.S., Understanding with Respect to Dis-
ciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection (visited Aug. 28, 1998)
<http://www.eurunion.org/news/invest.htm> [hereinafter Understanding].
Details were given by Stuart E. Eizenstat. See Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat
Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs Before the
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(mainly, government refusal of support for, and discouragement
of, investment in such property) to transactions in property cov-
ered by such claims. However, these disciplines would apply
only to transactions after April 18, 1998, and only where the
claim has been adjudged to be contrary to international law.
59
The system is to apply immediately (in exchange for a waiver
from the provisions of the Libertad Act), but the parties agree to
prepare proposals for its incorporation into the MAI.6 ° This is
clearly a bold initiative, although it remains to be seen whether
the details will receive the political support of their respective
constituencies.
61
These basic protective provisions must be read in conjunction
with the extremely wide definitions of "investment" and
"investor" in the draft, with important implications not only for
taxation, but also for other areas of regulation, in particular intel-
lectual property. The definition of "investor" includes not only
5 This could be (a) by an international arbitral tribunal or the courts of the
expropriating state; or (b) according to "modalities to be elaborated among the
participants or under the MAI" that the claim is well-founded and the claimant
has not been afforded adequate judicial remedies; or (c) where, on the request of
a participant which considers there has been a record of repeated illegal expro-
priations, evidence provided to the other participant is duly evaluated and ac-
cepted. Understanding, supra note 58, at 2. Annex D of the Understanding
provides assurances by the European Commission that, having evaluated the
evidence provided by the United States in respect of some Cuban claims, a
number of cases have been identified which appear to be contrary to interna-
tional law, and that in relation to these and any similar cases "it is reasonable to
assume" that the disciplines of the Understanding would be applied. Id. at 7.
60 The parties also agree to propose for inclusion in the MAI an article on
Conflicting Requirements. A daft is appended to the Understanding, which
would encourage states to avoid or minimise conflicts by "hav[ing] regard to
relevant principles of international law," "following an approach of moderation
and restraint," and taking "into account the sovereignty and legitimate.., law
enforcement.., interests of other... parties." Understanding supra note 58, at
8. This would be backed up by a procedure for consultations and consideration
by the MAI Parties Group. T is would be a milder alternative to the proposal,
presumably tabled by Canada, for inclusion in the MAI of a prohibition on ex-
traterritorial requirements imposed on investors, with a power for the Parties
Group to grant waivers.
61 Some initial reactions in Europe were negative: "The recent agreement is
unsatisfactory since the EU was compelled to accept extremely precise disci-
plines on investments, while receiving in exchange nothing but a simple com-
mitment from the American side to maintain the exceptions for European
companies," was the opinion expressed by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs, Erik Derycke. Public Hearing on Extra-Territorial Laws as Unilateral
Sanctions organised by the Committee on External Economic Relations of the
European Parliament on June 24: EU Press Report of June 29, 1998.
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nationals but permanent residents, and "investment" includes all
types of contractual rights, such as construction contracts, loans,
claims to money or performance, concessions, and intellectual
property rights. These maa be "owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly" by an investor. Thus, for example, speculative posi-
tions in financial derivatives channeled through a hedge fund in-
corporated in an offshore centre, but owned by residents of MAI
member states, could be treated as a protected "asset." The
breadth of this definition remains controversial, since it results
from the elimination from an earlier draft of a balancing "negative
list" of exclusions. Instead, the draft has since then included two
footnotes indicating that "further work is needed" in relation to
indirect investment, intellectual property, concessions, public
debt, and real estate, and that an interpretative note is contem-
plated to the effect that a protected asset must have "the character-
istics of an investment, such as the commitment of capital or
other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assump-
tion of risk."
63
4.3. Protection, Liberalisation and Deregulation
From this survey of its basic provisions, it can be seen that the
MAI attempts to achieve its aim of establishing a "high standards"
agreement by taking the strongest protective and liberalisation
provisions from existing models, mainly the BITs (especially the
U.S. model BIT), and NAFTA Chapter 11. Thus, the negotiators
can justify their claim that the draft itself contains nothing espe-
cially innovative. Yet, as an ensemble, it would clearly establish a
qualitatively new standard. Moreover, the MAI does not merely
offer a model for countries to use in bilateral negotiations, but
aims to establish a multilateral arrangement that would in effect
establish a single area for capital investments. Here lies its central
paradox, for it attempts to do so simply through strong invest-
ment liberalisation and protection obligations. These would have
the effect of destabilising many existing national regulatory ar-
62 MAI Text, supra note 21, at *11. The clear inclusion of indirectly owned
investments derives from U.S. practice in BITs and from the NAFTA; the MAI
also includes a "denial of benefits" article, also based on U.S. practice, to exclude
investments ultimately owned by investors of a non-Party, But routed through
a Party via an enterprise having no substantial business activities there. Id. at
*106.
63 Id. at 'I11.
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rangements, since they could be claimed to operate de jure or de
facto in a discriminatory manner, or involve the expropriation of
proprietary or contractual rights.
The investment protection provisions exceed not only the
standard established by generally accepted customary interna-
tional law," but also that of the Hull standard put forward by the
United States and other capital-exporting countries, since in the
MAI it applies not only to property but also to contractual rights.
64 It is noteworthy that there have been two major expropriation disputes
between OECD member countries taken to the International Court of Justice.
Both were claims of "indirect" or "creeping expropriation," and concerned the
terms of liquidation or refinancing of companies which had run into financial
difficulties. Although the claims of the investors were rejected under interna-
tional law at the time of those cases, it is far more likely or indeed probable that
they would have succeeded under the more stringent provisions of the MAI.
See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 5) (rejecting the claim by Belgium on behalf of the
shareholders of a company forced into liquidation, on the grounds that the
claim should have been made on behalf of the company itself, which was incor-
porated in Canada). The "indirect investment" rule in the MAI would circum-
vent this argument. The 'creeping expropriation' issue was directly considered
in Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSIJ(U.S. v. Italy) 1989 I.Cj. Rep. 4 (July 20), a
claim under the investment protection provisions of the Italy-U.S. Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1948. A Chamber of the ICJ, with
only the U.S. judge dissenting, rejected the claim by the United States on behalf
of Raytheon that the requisition of the plant of its wholly-owned subsidiary by
the Mayor of Palermo amounted to an expropriation. The key reasons were as
follows:
[T]he management of ELSI, at the material time, had no practical pos-
sibility of carrying out successfully a scheme of orderly liquidation un-
der its own management, and may indeed already have forfeited any
right to do so under Italian law, [hence] it cannot be said that it was
the requisition that deprived it of this faculty of control and manage-
ment. Furthermore, one feature of ELSI's position stands out: the un-
certain and speculative character of the causal connection, on which
the Applicant's case relies, between the requisition and the results at-
tributed to it by the Applicant. There were several causes acting to-
gether that led to the disaster to ELSI. No doubt the effects of the
requisition might have been one of the factors involved. But the un-
derlying cause was ELSI's headlong course towards insolvency; which
state of affairs it seems to have attained even prior to the requisition.
There was the warning loudly proclaimed about its precarious posi-
tion; there was the socially damaging decision to terminate the busi-
ness, close the plant, and dismiss t e workforce, there was the position
of the banks as major creditors. In short, the possibility of that solu-
tion of orderly liquidation, which Raytheon and Machlett claim to
have been deprived of as a result of the requisition, is purely a matter
of speculation.
Id. at 51.
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This point has recently been stressed by Guzman in relation to
the U.S. Model BIT, which he points out "imposes obligations on
host governments that exceed the traditional Hull Rule" since it
"applies not only to the expropriation of assets, but also to any
'breach' of an agreement. These obligations inevitably restrict
the sovereign powers of governments, and undermine any regula-
tory provisions that could be argued to interfere with contractual
or proprietary rights.
The MAI would also significantly depart from existing gener-
ally accepted international investment norms by requiring an
"open door" to foreign investors, which most BITs do not. A
65 Guzman, supra note 51, at 656-57. Guzman makes his point in relation
to BITs generally,-but his article is based on the provisions of the U.S. Model,
without including any analysis of the differences among BITs. The U.K. Model
BIT, for example, covers only investments directly owned by nationals or com-
panies of either party. Most model BITs protect investments made by investors
of the other contracting party, usually defined as individuals who are its nation-
als, or legal entities formed under its laws or having their seat there. See, e.g.,
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 26 (containing the model agreements of Aus-
tria, Chile, China, Denmark, Germany, Hong Kong, and the U.K.);see also
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT IN-
STRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM at 143, 151, 167, 185, U.N. Sales No.
E.96.11.A.11 (1996). The Dutch, French, Swiss, and U.S. models, however, do
include legal entities formed in third countries but owned or controlled, even
indirectly, by investors of a contracting party. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra
note 26, at 36-42.
66 The negotiation of BITs was initiated in 1959 by Germany, and then
taken up by other European countries. These agreements have been mainly po-
litical documents, attempting to strike a compromise with developing-country
governments anxious to attract foreign investments. See Guzman, supra note
51, at 653, 688. Increasingly, since the 1990s, Central and Eastern European
countries, and some developing countries, have been concluding such agree-
ments amongst themselves. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 1997, supra note 26, at 19. There was a significant shift
with the publication of the U.S. Model BIT in 1980, which was more exten-
sively and-tightly drafted in legal terms. However, comparatively few countries
have adopted the U.S. model, and acceptance of its terms did not gain ground
until the early 1990s. By January 1998 the United States had negotiated 41 such
treaties, 31 of which had been ratified. Russia has not yet ratified the treaty
signed in 1992, and none of the rapid-growth economies in East Asia and Latin
America has ratified a BIT with the United States, with the exception of Argen-
tina (in 1991, entering into force in 1994). Id. at 336-69. The Argentine treaty
was a significant break-through, entailing the virtual abandonment of the doc-
trine enunciated by the Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo a century earlier, that
property rights are a matter of the internal affairs of a country, and foreigners
are not entitled either to diplomatic or military protection by their home coun-
try. As a remaining obeisance to the Calvo doctrine, the treaty in its Article I-I
includes a provision exceptional in U.S. BITs reserving the right to regulate the
admission of investments "provided, however, that such laws and regulations
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broad national treatment requirement including a right of estab-
lishment has been accepted in regional integration agreements,
notably the EEC and NAFTA, and indeed the MAI draft is
largely based on NAFTA chapter 11. However, much of the
structure of NAFTA, and its political history, demonstrates the
consequences of prioritising liberalisation ahead of regulatory co-
ordination or harmonisation. The MAI envisages virtually no in-
stitutional structure: only a Parties Group whose task is to moni-
tor the operation of the existing provisions of the agreement and
approve accessions, and a Dispute-Settlement procedure for state-
state and investor-state disputes. These dispute-settlement proce-
dures are certainly a powerful element of the agreement, but they
are essentially an enforcement mechanism, replacing the more po-
litical procedures of peer-pressure used under the OECD Liberali-
zation Codes. As has been the experience with GATT and WTO
dispute-settlement, they are likely to favour market-access obliga-
tions over national regulatory requirements. The EEC at least es-
tablished an institutional structure through which liberalisation
and regulatory harmonisation could be pursued in tandem. In-
deed, this has added a further complication for the MAI, since the
European Commission has tabled a request for an exception to
MFN for a Regional Economic Integration Organisation
("REIO"), defined in terms which essentially are applicable only
to the EU. This proposal raises issues similar to those familiar in
relation to GATT Article XXIV. Its proponents argue that the
institutional structure of a REIO permits deeper integration and
hence more extensive liberalisation, which they should not be re-
quired to accord to non-members. However, the scope of this
clause is likely to be controversial, 67 especially in view of the
plans for EU enlargement. The REIO clause is linked to the
question of sub-national measures, which is also both controver-
shall not impair the substance of any of the rights set forth in this Treaty."
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ment, Nov. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., art. 3, S. Exec. Rep. No. 103-8 (entered into
force Oct. 20, 1994). Although Argentina has experienced a growth in FDI, it
has been surpassed by Brazil, which has far fewer BITs, and none with the
United States. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEv., WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 1997, supra note 26, at xxii, 366. There seems no evidence that accep-
tance of a high-standards BIT is important to increasing economic growth; if
anything it is to the contrary.
67 See Joachim Karl, Multilateral Investment Agreements and Regional Eco-
nomic Integration, TRANSNAT'L CORPS., Aug. 1996, at 19, 21.
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sial and significant, especially in relation to Australia, Canada, and
the United States.
4.4. Special Provisions, Carve-Outs and Exceptions
In order to deal with the interaction or potential incompatibil-
ity of its broad obligations with many areas of national economic
regulation, the MAI's basic principles are supplemented by a
range of exceptions, exclusions, and special provisions. The nego-
tiators have tried to restrict these for fear that the agreement
would resemble Swiss cheese. However, as the negotiations pro-
ceeded, and the implications of the basic principles for a wide
range of regulatory regimes became apparent, the "carve-outs" and
exclusions have grown, to the point that some now consider that
the agreement has more holes than cheese. These antinomies are
central to the difficulties that the negotiations have encountered,
and suggest that the basic principles of the agreement were a
wrong starting point.
The draft has long included some key special provisions or
"disciplines," which in effect provide further obligations on states
in relation to foreign investors. These include a Transparency ob-
ligation (to publish all laws, policies, and decisions of general ap-
plication relating to the Agreement), and the Performance Re-
quirements restrictions, already discussed above. Employment
and immigration laws are also subject to a limited discipline in the
provisions on rights of "temporary entry, stay and work" of in-
vestors committing a "substantial amount of capital," and of their
executive, managerial, or specialist employees, if they are
"essential to the enterprise."68 This does not exclude the applica-
tion of immigration and work permit laws, but states would be
restricted from applying these laws on the basis of the labour
market or other economic needs tests, or quota systems, for such
key personnel. Investors are also given the freedom to appoint
employees of their choice regardless of nationality, although a
footnote indicates that this is not meant to exclude national anti-
discrimination laws. The Privatization Article, which still ap-
pears to be controversial, is likely to allow special share arrange-
ments or other procedures which favour particular groups, such
as small purchasers or employees, provided they are not discrimi-
natory against foreigners. The articles on State Monopolies and
68 kAI Text, supra note 21, at "14.
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on Concessions have also been the focus of bargaining, as OECD
states seek to control the potential impact of the Open Door re-
quirement.
Other special provisions have the character of exclusions or
"carve-outs." Major carve-outs have resulted from the concerns
expressed by specialists in particular areas of regulation once they
were consulted on the basic provisions of the MAI. Thus, taxa-
tion will be carved out, except for the expropriation provisions, it
having been accepted that fair tax treatment for international in-
vestment is dealt with under the network of treaties for the pre-
vention of double taxation and fiscal evasion. Intellectual prop-
erty ("IP") raises more complex problems, which it is now clear
cannot be resolved merely by modifying the definition of invest-
ment (unless to exclude IP altogether). IP specialists have pointed
out that some IP management provisions, such as statutory or
compulsory licensing or the allocation of remuneration under col-
lective management schemes, could be construed as expropriatory
and/or discriminatory, but there is not yet agreement on how to
deal with this. Equally, there is no consensus yet on how to deal
with the interaction between the MAI, MFN, and NT obliga-
tions, and those of existing IP agreements, which are generally re-
ciprocal rather than unconditional. They are also working on a
number of other points of conflict between MAI obligations and
IP regimes.
Even more central to the MAI is the question of its impact on
financial regulation. Since the MAI covers all types of capital
flows, even purely speculative ones, it would prohibit all controls
designed to dampen volatility, such as Chile's deposit require-
ments, which in the aftermath of the Asian crises have drawn ap-
proval from authorities such as Stiglitz. Exceptions have been in-
cluded for central bank transactions for monetary or exchange
rate management purposes, and for Temporary Safeguards, provi-
sions which were drafted with considerable involvement of IMF
specialists. These apply only in the event of serious balance-of-
payments or external financial difficulties, or in exceptional cir-
cumstances where capital movements cause or threaten damage to
macroeconomic policies. Measures adopted must be temporary,
proportional, and compatible with IMF obligations, and must be
reported to both the IMF and the Parties Group, and a procedure
would be established for their joint review and (dis)approval (in
which event the dispute-settlement procedures are inapplicable).
In addition, a special section has been drafted on financial services,
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which exempts prudential measures, "provided they are not used
as a means of avoiding the Contracting Party's commitments or
obligations under the Agreement," 69 and lays down some fair
treatment rules relevant to this sector, in relation to matters such
as authorisation procedures, membership of exchanges and self-
regulatory bodies, access to payments and clearing systems, etc.
There are indications that some negotiators were uncomfortable
with the special treatment of this sector, which is said to be justi-
fied by the special need for prudential measures. This appears to
be the only industry in relation to which "fair treatment" rules
are to be included. Others which might have been considered,
e.g., telecommunications or transportation, have been left for ne-
gotiation, presumably in other forums, and in the meantime will
presumably be subject to exceptions or reservations.
In contrast to such special provisions and carve-outs, the Gen-
eral Exceptions Article is very modest. At present, the main gen-
eral exception covers actions which a Party considers necessary to
protect "essential security interests," taken in time of war or other
international emergency, relating to non-proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction or concerning arms production. However,
the exception is essentially self-judging, as dispute-settlement is
limited to the right of other parties to consultations. Also ex-
cluded are measures in compliance with U.N. obligations for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and a limited ex-
ception for action "necessary for the maintenance of public or-
der." There is also a proposal on the table, supported by the
French and Canadian governments (and strongly opposed by the
U.S. media industry lobbies) to exclude "policies designed to pre-
serve and promote cultural and linguistic diversity."
Thus, the negotiators appear, so far, to have avoided creating
any list of exceptions, such as was established in GATT Article
XX, which might require any balancing of national regulatory ar-
rangements with the general liberalisation and investment protec-
tion provisions of the MAI. On the other hand, many of the
carve-outs and special provisions essentially fulfil that function in
69 This is likely to exclude measures restricting foreign ownership of banks
or other financial institutions, although a World Bank study has indicated that
some restrictions on foreign banks may be important to prevent cream-
skimming and ensure more equal competition. See Ross Levine, Foreign Banks,
Financial Development, and Economic Growth, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
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a more elaborate way, approaching that provided in the related
WTO agreements such as the TBT and SPS, which essentially
spell out the conditions for compliance with some of the Article
XX obligations. However, the proposals on Environment and
Related Matters and on Labour, made in response to pressures
from NGOs, at present reject the need for general exceptions
along the lines of GATT Article XX, and are carefully drafted to
ensure no conflict with, and therefore no need to balance against,
basic MAI obligations.
In addition to the carve-outs and special exceptions, the main
method for reconciling MAI obligations with national regulatory
arrangements is country-specific exceptions, initially referred to in
the drafts as reservations. The terminology was changed, appar-
ently to make it clear that, unlike normal reservations to treaties,
they do not operate reciprocally, although a country may list an
exception which is subject to reciprocity. Country-specific excep-
tions would "grandfather" existing measures particular to a mem-
ber, and generally must be accepted by the other contracting par-
ties at the time of signature or later accession. In some cases, a
treaty may permit new exceptions to be made unilaterally,7 1 al-
though this is rather contrary to the principle of "grandfathering,"
which essentially aims to achieve the "standstill," and potentially
the "rollback" of exceptions. Thus, every member would have its
own Schedule, which would list any measures which it wished to
maintain although they might be contrary to the basic obligations
of the MAI. Thus, the MAI is a "top-down" agreement, unlike
the GATS, for example, which applies only as and when states
make specific commitments, and is therefore considered "bottom-
up." A bottom-up agreement would establish a framework
within which the economic and regulatory implications of liber-
alisation could be considered sector-by-sector, as is occurring
through the GATS. The MAI's obligations could be binding for
up to twenty years, since parties would not be allowed to with-
draw for five years from its entry into force, and it would con-
tinue to apply for fifteen years from the date of notification of
withdrawal to investments made by that date. Much therefore
depends on the initial national schedules of exceptions, on which
the MAI parties have held extensive negotiations, with the aim of
70 See CHAIRMAN'S NOTE, supra note 43.
71 The U.S. Model BIT allows a party to make new exceptions, although
these must be notified to the other.
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reaching an acceptable "balance of commitments." It seems likely
that exceptions would be divided into a List A and List B, to al-
low exemptions from the standstill and rollback of some types of
exceptions, and even that the possibility of reservations (based on
reciprocity) would be introduced, perhaps to deal with matters
such as the "cultural" exception.
5. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK
FOR INVESTMENT
Whatever the outcome of the MAI negotiations, lessons must
be learned from them, and from the draft text, to inform subse-
quent negotiations for a more comprehensive instrument. As this
analysis has shown, the combination of nondiscrimination and
special treatment requirements in the MAI draft prioritises liber-
alisation, putting pressure on existing state measures of regulation.
As with the GATT in the field of trade, the starting-point of a
general liberalisation obligation also produces a range of general
and special exceptions and reservations, as well as "carve-outs" and
special provisions, which provide a basis for justification for many
measures. The main point is that liberalisation requirements do
very little to establish clear criteria for fair treatment in the spe-
cific contexts of particular industries or in the application of for-
mally nondiscriminatory regulations (e.g., competition policies,
or discretionary administrative measures). Hence, the MAI itself
is an agenda opening up a range of issues about linkages between
various regulatory arrangements affecting investment, just as the
GATT increasingly opened up issues about trade-related regula-
tory measures from the 1960s onward. As has been learned from
the Uruguay Round and its aftermath, the question is how such
linkages should be structured, to establish a sound and secure basis
for global economic relations.
Such linkages may take several forms. Until now, they have
generally consisted of the elaboration of compatibility rules.
Thus, several of the GATT Article XX exceptions have been sup-
plemented by WTO agreements, in particular those on Technical
Barriers to Trade ("TBT") and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures ("SPS"). These may be described as "negative linkages," since
they presume that national measures must be disallowed unless
they can be shown to comply with a relevant international stan-
dard. The MAI provisions on monetary controls are of this type,
providing criteria for valid controls plus a presumption that IMF-
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approved controls are MAI-compliant. Such provisions are
needed, at a minimum in order to clarify the relationships be-
tween different and potentially conflicting international regimes.
Some argue that the problem may be dealt with by treaty inter-
pretation rules. However, the application of rules such as later-in-
time or generalia specialibus non derogat is by no means straight-
forward. It is not clear, for example, whether GATT 1947, as re-
incorporated into the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994, pre-dates or
post-dates multilateral environmental agreements ("MEAs") in-
volving trade restrictions which were negotiated in the 1980s.
72
Nor is it clear whether the trade liberalisation obligations of
GATT should be regarded as more "specific" or more "general"
than the trade restrictive provisions of a MEA. What is clear is
that GATT prioritises free trade, and is backed by compulsory
dispute-settlement with the ultimately strong sanction of denial of
market access. Thus, these types of "negative linkages" essentially
introduce a downward ratchet on standards by presuming the in-
validity of national requirements and failing to introduce interna-
tionally-agreed standards as a requirement.
A sounder framework for global economic integration re-
quires the deployment of positive linkages, in order to strengthen
the framework of internationally-agreed provisions harmonising
regulation, or establishing global standards. An example of this is
the TRIPs agreement which, whatever its other limitations, in-
troduced an ingenious mechanism for establishing a minimum
level of protection to facilitate trade in goods incorporating pro-
prietary technology. By linking participation in existing IP trea-
ties, as well as a set of minimum substantive and enforcement
standards, to the trade regime, it helped to overcome the
"enforcement gap" created by the temptation to free-ride which is
inherent in the traditional liberal system for international rule-
making.
What positive linkages might be appropriate for a multilateral
investment framework? An agreement of the MAI type, although
formally one between states, creates rights for private parties
(investors), which may be enforced in national courts if directly
applicable in national law, or through the arbitration procedures
specified in the Dispute-Settlement provisions. Thus, it could be
72 This may be further complicated by specific articles in some treaties aim-
ing to prevent conflicts, e.g., NAFTA. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK &
ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 351 (1995).
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appropriate to create linkages both as a conditionality require-
ment for state participation in the agreement (as with TRIPs), and
as a means of balancing investor rights with responsibilities. This
would provide a means of giving a harder legal status to some of
the soft-law codes governing international business conduct which
have been agreed upon over the past two decades. This could cer-
tainly apply, for example, to the OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises, which at present the MAI proposes to annex,
but in a non-binding form. The Guidelines are clearly not drafted
in such a way as to require them to be implemented by states in
their internal laws. However, they do embody standards which
might be relevant for a court or arbitral body to consider in rela-
tion to a claim by an investor. Indeed, investors might themselves
wish to cite the Guidelines to support a claim of discriminatory
treatment. A similar status could be given to more specific codes,
such as the WHO Code on Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes.
Although some countries have enacted laws incorporating or
based on this Code, many have not. Yet issues of compliance
with the Code might be relevant, for example, to a complaint by
a firm that it had been discriminated against in administrative de-
cisions about hospital or health-care purchasing.
Perhaps more importantly, consideration should be given to
establishing TRIPs-style linkages between a multilateral invest-
ment protection instrument and intergovernmental agreements
establishing regulatory standards. For example, a key provision
for investors is the freedom to make financial transfers, and this is
broadly guaranteed in the MAI. Yet the largely unregulated char-
acter of the enormous volume of global financial business has
given rise to increasing concern in the past five to six years. The
MAI does little to improve international financial regulation,
apart from exempting national prudential requirements and tem-
porary monetary controls compatible with IMF obligations. The
Basle Committee, after several years of work, has formulated a set
of Core Principles for Financial Supervision, yet it has no means
of inducing states to comply with these standards, except by rely-
ing on its prestige and perhaps by developing "shaming" proce-
dures. Further, there is no mechanism available for protecting
investors or firms from the temptation of using financial centres
whose regulatory arrangements fall short of such internationally-
agreed standards. This could be established if the right of free
movement for financial transfers were limited to payments made
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to jurisdictions having financial supervision systems approved as
Basle-Committee-compliant.
A similar linkage could be established in relation to interna-
tional tax enforcement arrangements. The broad definitions of
"investor" and "investment" in the MAI, as mentioned above,
cover indirect investment. While this may be justified in order to
cope with the complexity of international corporate structures, it
will also necessarily create a further incentive, if one were needed,
for special tax arrangements to be offered by countries wishing to
attract the formation of intermediary holding companies of vari-
ous sorts. The carve-out for taxation proposed in the MAI as-
sumes the existence of bilateral tax treaties, but does not condition
the right to make transfers on the existence of such a treaty be-
tween the source and destination countries of such a transfer.
Such a condition would provide an incentive for the negotiation
of appropriate treaties, or else a disincentive for firms tempted to
seek tax advantages by incorporating intermediaries in dubious
jurisdictions. More ambitiously, the MAI, or a future global ar-
rangement regulating international investment, could be part of a
broader package, which could include international agreements
aimed at improving regulatory standards and cooperation. Some
of these could be made mutually conditional, while others could
be associated, and participation in them encouraged by peer-
pressure methods. For example, the OECD itself (in conjunction
with the Council of Europe) negotiated the multilateral Conven-
tion on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters of 1988,
which however has received only a handful of ratifications. If
participation in this treaty were a condition of accession to the
MAI, it would provide a great encouragement to the international
tax enforcement effort, one which is sorely needed.
If we look beyond the MAI, therefore, to a more ambitious
prospect, we should ask what international agreements or codes
should form part of a package setting up a Multilateral Investment
Organisation. Such a perspective is not one that seems to be part
of the present negotiating agenda. It is certainly easy to find ob-
jections and political obstacles to such an approach. In particular,
governments of less-developed countries understandably react
suspiciously to attempts to impose on them unnecessary regula-
tory requirements which might hinder their development. Thus,
the emphasis should be on the identification of core standards in
every relevant area. When this is done, it is not just less-
developed countries that are found to be at fault, even in the case
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of the core labour standards of the ILO, or the tax assistance ar-
rangements cited above, but some of the most developed countries
are found to be failing. Participation in international arrange-
ments establishing substantive and enforcement standards is often
too hard to achieve due to short-term calculations of immediate
advantages. The creation of conditionality by the appropriate use
of linkages might help to create an upward ratchet for regulatory
standards towards internationally-agreed minima, rather than the
downwards ratchet created by the present tendencies to prioritise
liberalisation. It could also help to create a wider confidence that
a more integrated world economy could be built on stronger
regulatory foundations.
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